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## SOVIET ASSERTION ON PLANE BACKED

**Defectors Support Belief  
C-130 Downed in 1958  
Was on Spy Mission**

Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, Sept. 6—The United States defectors from the National Security Agency have given the Soviet Union new evidence to support their contention that the United States plane that went down in Soviet Armenia in September, 1958, was on espionage mission.

William Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, who appeared at a press conference today to tell how they had defected to the Soviet Union said a high official of the N. S. A. had told one of them that the plane was "carrying electronics specialists and special equipment for receiving at close range the signals of Soviet radar transmitters."

### **Call Border Crossing Deliberate**

The official was said to have revealed that the Turkish-Armenian border had been deliberately crossed to get into the immediate proximity of Soviet radar installations.

In a prepared statement Mr. Martin and Mr. Mitchell said the plane had crossed the border on Sept. 2 and the United States contended it had lost its way during a scientific mission and was shot down by Soviet fighters.

The bodies of six of the crewmen were returned to United States officials at the Turkish border Sept. 24. Despite repeated exchanges of notes and demands by the United States for information about the remaining eleven crewmen the Soviet Union maintains it has no knowledge of where they are.

The allegations by Mr. Martin and Mr. Mitchell about the C130 plane took up a large portion of their statement as to why they had defected and asked for Soviet citizenship. They started this section of statement by asserting that flights of United States planes along and across Soviet borders were "routine operations" and the number of such flights was far greater than generally supposed to be.

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## PRESIDENT CALLS PAIR TRAITOROUS

**Defense Department Says  
Statements Are False—  
One Termed 'Sick'**

**By JACK RAYMOND**

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 6—President Eisenhower called the two defectors from the National Security Agency traitors today after they had denounced the United States in Moscow.

Statements made by Vernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin in Moscow were "falsehoods," the Defense Department said.

The men are "turncoats" and "tools of Soviet propaganda," the department added. One of the two men is "mentally sick" and both are "obviously confused," it said.

The Defense Department did not, however, identify which of the men it considered sick although it had reported in a previous statement that one of them had been undergoing psychiatric treatment.

### Walter Denies Report

Representative Francis H. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania, denied that he had made an allegation, reported by a news agency, that one of the men had been described as a homosexual in a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

While the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department centered their fire on the defectors and what a Government spokesman called Soviet "spy hysteria," Congressional investigations were set on the Government's own conduct in the case.

Representative Walter, chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, said that

## Eisenhower Scores Defectors to Soviet As Traitors to U.S.

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

his unit would begin closed hearings Sept. 16, possibly with Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates Jr. as the first witness.

Mr. Walter said that his inquiry would stress the question of hiring practices in the National Security Agency and all Government agencies. Many persons once dropped as "secu-

rity risks" have managed to regain their jobs, he said.

An effort by his committee to subpoena personnel officials and records failed, it was understood because the process server could not get into the heavily guarded headquarters of the N. S. A., a unit of the Defense Department, under command of Lieut. Gen. John A. Samford, at Fort Meade, Md.

The case did throw unusual light, however, on the National Security Agency, whose operations are sometimes confused with Central Intelligence Agency, an intelligence gathering organization. The N. S. A. is devoted to various forms of cryptography, the art of coded messages and their transmission. Its work, which never has been

publicly acknowledged, is to study all types of diplomatic and military codes, learn how to make them and break them for intelligence purposes.

In the work, mathematicians are employed in work with computers and other types of electronics machines which can be "taught to think" in solving word, letter and number patterns.

## MOSCOW STAGES DEFECTORS' SCENE

**Martin and Mitchell Talk  
to Newsmen in Setting of  
Soviet Propaganda**

Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, Sept. 6—William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, the defectors from the United States, found in the glare of a Moscow news conference today the public forum they had apparently sought to propound their theory that the United States was endangering peace.

For ninety minutes Messrs. Martin and Mitchell lectured Western and Communist correspondents on how they thought the world should be run. When

their Soviet hosts suggested it was time to quit Mr. Martin protested.

"But I want to continue," he said.

Mikhail A. Kharlamov, chief of the press department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, allowed Mr. Martin one more jab at United States intelligence activities. Then the pair with their Soviet escorts left, remarking that they would "continue our educations" as Soviet citizens.

It was 12:40 P. M. when the conference in the House of Journalists ended and already the Moscow radio had broadcast to the world details of the prepared statements by the two defectors.

### Took Action in June

According to Messrs. Martin and Mitchell their journey to Moscow began in Washington in June after they had asked Soviet authorities "to be allowed to make their homes"

here. The two men were then junior mathematicians in the National Security Agency.

In declining to give details as to how they reached Moscow, Mr. Martin said with a broad grin and to Soviet applause that "others may want to use the same route."

Washington reported last month that the defectors had been traced in Mexico and Cuba before they disappeared.

In Moscow the stage was set for the unveiling of what are being described here as the American prototypes of Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean, the two British diplomats who defected in 1951 and were put before a news conference here five years later.

Western correspondents were notified yesterday and again this morning by Foreign Ministry officials of an extraordinary news conference. The correspondents found the conference room jammed with Soviet prop-

aganda personnel, television cameras and recording equipment, at a table covered with a green linen cloth with eleven microphones before six places were Messrs. Martin and Mitchell.

Under the glare of the television lights, Mr. Kharlamov sat in the center, smiling broadly. Mr. Martin wearing a dark brown suit with an orange-striped black tie and Mr. Mitchell, who was wearing a gray suit with a red-striped gray tie, were seated at Mr. Kharlamov's right. Two interpreters took the end positions.

Mr. Martin sat impassively and Mitchell let a smile curl the corners of his mouth when Kharlamov rose, introduced the two, announced that their requests for political asylum and Soviet citizenship had been granted and that they were now "ful fledged Soviet citizens."

soon became evident from

both the assured demeanor of the two defectors as well as the arrangements by their statements that this was a moment carefully prepared for.

It was only when Messrs. Martin and Mitchell, long-time bachelor friends who had served in the Navy together between 1951 and 1954, spoke of their problems of personal adjustment that they seemed less sure of themselves.

Mr. Martin, a pink-checked, blond-haired well-groomed man and Mr. Mitchell, a lean dark-haired man, whose pale blue eyes constantly flicked behind horn-rimmed glasses, smiled at each other when the latter read from their parting statement these personal remarks:

"Besides the disillusionment and concern which we have voiced over certain United States policies other factors have strongly motivated us to go to Soviet Union.

# Text of Statements Read in Moscow by Former U. S. Security Agency Workers



**MOSCOW NEWS CONFERENCE:** Bernon F. Mitchell, right, and William H. Martin, second from right, former employees of the U. S. National Security Agency,

Associated Press Radiophoto  
talking to reporters yesterday in the House of Journalists. In center is Mikhail A. Kharlamov, press chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Others are interpreters.

Following, as issued by the Soviet press agency Tass, are the texts of a statement said to have been left in a bank in Laurel, Md., by Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, former employees of the National Security Agency, before they left the United States, and of a statement to the press made by the two men at a news conference in Moscow:

## Predeparture Declaration

We hope to explain to our relatives, friends and others who may be interested why we have sought citizenship in the Soviet Union.

Since going to work for the National Security Agency in the summer of 1957, we have learned that the United States Government knowingly makes false and deceptive statements both in defending its own actions and in condemning the actions of other nations. We also learned that the United States Government sometimes secretly manipulates money and military supplies in an effort to bring about the overthrow of Governments which are felt to be unfriendly to the United States.

Finally, an instance came to our attention where the United States Government gave money to a code clerk working in the Washington embassy of a United States ally for supplying information which assisted in the decryption of that ally's coded messages.

These activities indicate to us that the United States Government is as unscrupulous as it has accused the Soviet Government of being.

Many people working in the Department of Defense and in the intelligence agencies of the United States Government know the truth of what we have asserted. However, if anyone were to verify any portion of it without official permission he would be subject to heavy penalties.

## U-2 Not a Factor

The recent U-2 incident had nothing to do with our decision to defect, for this decision was made more than a year ago. The U-2 incident was a truth that was too obvious to be permanently suppressed or altered.

In making these revelations we are not seeking excuses for our action. Neither do we wish to discourage the American people. There are individuals of great integrity and resourcefulness in America who, if given a chance, can rectify some of the tragic acts of the United States Government in recent years.

Besides the disillusionment and concern which we have voiced over certain United States policies, other factors have strongly motivated us to go to the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union our main values and interests appear to be shared by a greater number of people. Consequently we feel that we will be better accepted socially there and will be better able to carry out our professional activities.

Another motivating factor is that the talents of women are encouraged and utilized to a much greater extent in the Soviet Union than in the United States. We feel that this encourages women and makes Soviet women more desirable as mates.

What are the important issues which divide the people of the United States and the Soviet Union? One cannot argue convincingly that the Soviets are evil because they have corrupted Christian virtue. If most Soviet citizens do not accept Jesus Christ as their personal saviour, that is their business.

## Issues Are Mentioned

The important issues, we believe, concern which economic and political practices best serve the interests of mankind.

A disadvantage of capitalist society is that its science and technology cause needless human suffering by contributing to technological unemployment. It is no wonder that so many people in America feel resentful towards intellectual and creative activities. We hope to become scientific workers in the Soviet Union and we believe that we will be able to engage in scientific investigations there without the economic hardships of others.

Some people in the United States who are opposed to communism have advocated a preventive war with the Soviet Union. They seek a kind of security which involves the annihilation of people with views opposed to their own. Such a war would at best leave them emperors over the graveyard of civilization.

Rather than devoting their energies to the development of newer and more powerful means of destruction, we hope that both the United States and the Soviet Union will divert their efforts towards competition in the ideological arena. One means of achieving this would be to widely publish in both countries, in mutually agreed upon volume, unedited debates about economic and political theory and practice. It is difficult to appreciate one's own propaganda without having listened to the propaganda of others.

As a means of increasing mutual understanding, we feel that the exchanges already under way between the two countries of cultural, scientific and industrial delegations should be continued and expanded.

This statement has been made without consulting with the Government of the Soviet Union.

The reasons for this are that we feel that we owe the American people an explanation of our action in our own

words, and we wish to make this explanation in such a way that it cannot be later construed as a propaganda statement inspired by the Government of the nation in which we have asked to be allowed to make our homes.

WILLIAM H. MARTIN  
BERNON F. MITCHELL.

### Statement to Press

Before leaving the United States of America at the end of June this year, we left the previously read statement in safety deposit box No. 174 in the State Bank of Laurel, Mo., rented in the name of Bernon F. Mitchell. We brought with us here a photographic copy of this statement.

On the envelope containing this statement, we wrote and signed a request that the contents be made public, because we wished to explain to the American people why we decided to ask the Soviet Union to grant us political asylum.

Reports in the American press indicate that United States authorities gained access to the safety deposit box and found our statement. But they did not fulfill our request to publish it. We can explain this only by assuming that the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration does not wish certain aspects of its policies to become known to the American people.

At this press conference, which has been arranged at our request, we would like to explain, especially to the American public, our reasons for leaving the United States.

We were employees of the highly secret National Security Agency, which gathers communications intelligence from almost all nations of the world for use by the United States Government. However, the simple fact that the United States is engaged in delving into the secrets of other nations had little or nothing to do with our decision to defect.

### Policy Proves A Worry

Our main dissatisfaction concerned some of the practices the United States uses in gathering intelligence information. We were worried about the United States policy of deliberately violating the airspace of other nations, and the United States Government's practice of lying about such violations in a manner intended to mislead public opinion.

Furthermore, we were disenchanted by the United States Government's practice of intercepting and deciphering the secret communications of its own allies. Finally, we objected to the fact that the United States Government was willing to go so far as to recruit agents from among the personnel of its allies. An instance of this practice, involving payment to a code clerk of a United States ally, was mentioned in our first statement.

At this time we would like to make some general comments relative to our reasons for leaving the United States.

Before joining N. S. A., we had a high degree of confidence in the honesty of the United States Government and we considered ourselves to be loyal supporters of the American way of life. But the policies mentioned above, which have been carried out by the United States Government in recent years, raised serious doubts in our minds as to whether the causes these policies are intended to support are actually worthwhile.

It was a difficult and painful experience to leave our native country, families and friends. Yet, we felt that the United States Government, in carrying out policies dangerous to world peace, should not be allowed to rely upon these emotional attachments to guarantee the loyalty of its citizens.

In the statement which we left in the United States, we expressed the opinion that a preventive war would be futile. It should be evident that those who contemplate unleashing wars constitute a grave threat to humanity. Should another world war occur, there would probably be no further opportunity to build communism, capitalism,

### General's Statement Recalled

General Power, Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Air Command, made the following statement, which was published in the United States in testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations during debate on the 1958-60 military budget.

He said, "I would like to leave the deterrent role a moment and talk about the philosophy of initiation of a war and the tremendous advantages that accrue to the man who starts a war. \* \* \* You always must have a capability to strike first, because obviously if these people thought we never could start a war, why, then they could just take this world away from us piece by piece, because they would know that as long as they do not strike us, we could never do anything about it."

General Power's statement involves the dangerous presumption that the United States owns the world and implies that the emulation of the Soviet Union represents taking something away from the United States. His proposal to strike first in an attempt to prevent the trend toward socialism sounds to us like a more suicidal than effective policy.

Senator Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Republican Senator campaign committee, made a speech in Chicago on the eve of the Republican National Convention, in which he said, "We must not agree to a further ban on nuclear testing, nor disarmament in the near future."

In this same speech, he also said, to our undying national shame, "there are among us those who would prefer to crawl on their bellies to Moscow rather than to face the possibility of an atomic war."

We do not hesitate to include ourselves in the company mentioned by Senator Goldwater. In fact, we would attempt to crawl to the moon if we thought it would lessen the threat of an atomic war.

General Power and Senator Goldwater occupy important posts in American society, but we do not believe that they reflect the attitudes of the majority of the American people.

### Nixon's View Cited

After the U-2 incident, the United States Government admitted its policy of deliberately violating the airspace of the Soviet Union. United States officials, particularly Vice President Nixon, tried to justify this policy by claiming that it was the only way to forestall a surprise attack by the U. S. S. R. Vice President

Nixon did not mention that much of the information gathered on these flights could be useful only in an attempt to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet Union.

In connection with this, the statements of General Power take on ominous meaning. They could indicate that there are plans in the United States to forestall a surprise attack by the Soviet Union by striking first. It is very difficult for the Soviet Union and other nations to assume that General Power was only expressing his private opinion in his official testimony before Congress.

Besides its attempts to contain communism in the Eastern Hemisphere, the United States recently declared that it would not tolerate Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps United States hostility towards communism arises out of feeling of insecurity engendered by Communist achievements in science, culture and industry. If this is so, such feelings of insecurity are a poor excuse for endangering world peace.

The ring of United States military bases surrounding the

Soviet Union seems to indicate that the United States Government thinks it can effectively combat the ideas of communism by military means.

If the United States and the Soviet Union were to improve communications between their peoples, perhaps there would not be so much mutual antagonism and conditions might be created which would make possible the large-scale diversion of military funds to peaceful purposes.

Let us now consider the aerial intelligence policies of the United States Government. Our first acquaintance with these policies was during the time that we served with the United States Navy, from 1951 to 1954. We both served as communications technicians at several United States naval radio intercept stations during this period.

The United States Government has recently admitted carrying out intelligence flights around and over the borders of Communist nations only during the last four years. However, we would like to state that these flights were also being conducted in the period 1952-54, when we were serving at a United States naval radio intercept station at Kamiseya, Japan, near Yokohama.

In advance of a reconnaissance flight of a United States military plane along the Chinese or Soviet Far Eastern borders, a top-secret message would be sent to Kamiseya and other communications informing them as to the flight time and course of the plane.

### Radar Monitors Employed

At the designated flight time, monitors at these stations would tune in on the frequencies used by radar reporting stations of the target country, i. e., the Soviet Union or Communist China. At the same time, radio direction finders would tune in on these frequencies to seek out the locations of the radar reporting stations.

Information gathered in this manner would then be forwarded to the National Security Agency. There, analysts study the communications and code systems used by the radar stations. N. S. A. is then able to estimate the degree of alertness, accuracy and efficiency of the radar defenses of the target nation and it is also able to collect information about the organization of command within the target nation's internal defense system.

After going to work for the National Security Agency, we learned about another type of aerial intelligence mission which involves incursion into the airspace of the target nation. These missions, known as ELINT missions (electronics intelligence), consist of flights in the immediate proximity of radar installations of the Soviet Union and other countries to obtain data about the physical nature of radiations from radar transmitters. This information is used in an attempt to find ways to render the radar defense system ineffective, for instance through the use of radar jamming devices operating from bases close to the Soviet borders.

Flights of United States planes along and over the borders of the Soviet Union are routine operations and the number of such flights is far greater than is generally supposed by the United States public. In order to clarify the nature of such flights, we would like to discuss one of them in detail.

In September, 1958, a United States C-130 plane flew over the Turkish border into Soviet Armenia. This plane never returned. The United States Government, as it invariably does in such cases, issued a cover story claiming that the plane was engaged only in gathering scientific information and that the crossing of the Soviet border was accidental. The United States claimed that the C-130 had been shot down over Soviet territory without provocation. The Soviet side confined itself to a statement that the plane had crashed.

In February, 1959, the State Department released a recording in the Russian language which it claimed substantiated its contention that the C-130 had been shot down inside the Soviet Union.

ment said nothing about the actual reason that this plane was flying over the Soviet Union.

In connection with this incident, we would like to make the following comments:

Late in the afternoon of the same day that the State Department released the above recording, Lieut. Gen. John Samford, director of N. S. A., speaking on the N. S. A. internal broadcasting system, suggested that N. S. A. personnel refrain from discussion of any questions pertaining to the C-130 flight. It is clear that if the C-130 had really flown with the sole intent of gathering scientific information, N. S. A. would have had nothing to conceal.

### Suggestion Not Followed

Despite General Samford's suggestion, N. S. A. employees did discuss among themselves the possible far-reaching consequences of the C-130 incident for the United States.

A high official of N. S. A. told William Martin that this particular C-130 plane was carrying electronics specialists and special equipment for receiving at close range the signals of Soviet radar transmitters. This official added that the Turkish-Armenian border had been deliberately crossed in order to get into immediate proximity of Soviet radar installations.

It should be clear even to a layman that information about radar defenses has no bearing whatsoever on the problem of ascertaining whether or not the Soviet Union is preparing for a surprise attack. This information can be utilized only for the purpose of determining the defense potential of the Soviet Union.

States officials condemned the Soviet Union for allegedly shooting down the C-130 without sufficient reason. Hubert Humphrey said in effect that the Soviet Union should not have shot down the C-130 and should refrain from molesting United States planes in the future. His arguments assumed that the State Department's statements regarding the incident were truthful and that the United States was the injured and innocent party.

Thinking that Senator Humphrey and perhaps most members of Congress were ignorant of the facts, we decided to speak privately with a Congressman and see if this was the case. In February,

1959, we obtained an appointment with a Congressman who had publicly expressed concern over the State Department's concealing from Congress pertinent facts about the C-130 incident.

we discussed the statements of Hubert H. Humphrey and commented on the failure of the Executive Branch to keep Congress correctly informed. We explained to him the nature of the C-130 intelligence mission and indicated that we felt such violations of the airspace of other nations of the airspace of other nations were dangerous to world peace.

Our conversation was interrupted when the Congressman received a telephone call from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Mr. William Macomber, who requested him to refrain from further public discussion of the C-130 incident. Again, it is clear that if this plane had been engaged solely in gathering scientific information, the State Department would have had no reason to be concerned.

### Other Flights Revealed

Further corroboration that the United States has a policy of conducting overflights was obtained when a high official of N. S. A. told Bernon Mitchell that the United States had intentionally violated the Chinese Communist borders of aerial intelligence missions.

We hope that the American public will bring pressure to bear against the United States Government's policy of violating the airspace of other nations.

A single incident or misinterpretation concerning the purpose of planes involved in these flights could be the cause of war.

It is difficult to understand how United States officials can maintain an attitude of indignation when the Soviet Union takes defensive action against United States planes lying over its territory.

The Soviet Government has shown great forbearance with respect to these flights and has repeatedly called upon the United States Government to cease them. Moreover, so far as we know, the Soviet Government has refrained from making any retaliatory flights around and over the United States.

We have purposefully stressed in detail the intelligence flights of American planes over the territory of the Soviet Union and other countries because this practice might be the cause of a great catastrophe.

The connection of N. S. A. with aerial intelligence missions has already been described. Now, in order to give a better perspective of N. S. A., we would like to add the following details:

Some information concerning N. S. A.'s activities is given in the book "Central Intelligence and National Security" by Harry Howe Ransom, Harvard University Press, 1958. The author correctly

specializes in communications intelligence. It operates as a semi-autonomous agency of the Department of Defense, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense's office of special operations.

"In addition to maintaining its own professional staff for technical operations, N. S. A. exercises broad supervision over and coordination of the Army security agency and similar communications, intelligence groups within the Navy and Air Force."

### Book Passages Quoted

Further Ransom states:

"N. S. A. plays a major, if unobtrusive, role in the national intelligence community. . . . At any rate, through the National Security Agency and related units, the American Government is again engaged in communications intelligence on a world-wide scale.

"N. S. A. headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade, Md., about twenty-five miles north of Washington, D. C. The N. S. A. building at Fort Meade is second in size only to the Pentagon among United States Government buildings. Approximately 10,000 people work there, under the direction of Air Force Lieut. Gen. John A. Samford. About \$100,000,000 a year are spent to maintain the N. S. A. headquarters at Fort Meade, the basement of which contains a large number of electronic computers.

"The network of radio intercept stations which supply information to N. S. A. extends throughout the world and keeps in continuous operation more than 2,000 manual intercept positions, which are staffed by more than 8,000 Armed Forces intercept operators. A smaller number of additional personnel operate equipment for the interception of radio teletype transmissions.

"Some intercept units are located on ships and planes, but most of the intercept activity is carried out at United States military radio stations located in foreign countries. Both enciphered and plaintext communications are monitored from almost every nation in the world, including the nations on whose soil these intercept bases are located.

"To maintain this extensive network of intercept stations and to forward intercept material to N. S. A. headquarters costs about \$380,000,000 a year.

"Thus, including the cost of operating N. S. A. headquarters, the United States spends almost half a billion dollars a year for communications intelligence.

N. S. A. headquarters is subdivided into four main offices: The Office of Production (PROD), The Office of Development (DEV), The Office of Communications Security (COMSEC), and The Office of Security.



"The major functions of PROD are to receive intercept material from the outstations, to perform cryptanalysis and traffic analysis and to analyze the resulting information. R/D carries out research in the fields of cryptanalysis, digital computing and radio propagation and carries out the development of new communications equipment.

"COMSEC is responsible for the production and security of United States cipher systems.

"SEC conducts investigations of N. S. A. personnel, gives lie detector test, passes on the loyalty and integrity of N. S. A. personnel.

"Major subdivisions within PROD and R/D are as follows:

#### PROD

"ADVA—studies high level Soviet cipher systems and diplomatic codes.

"GENS—studies Soviet military code systems and medium level cipher system.

"ACOM—studies the code and cipher systems of Asian Communist nations.

"ALLO—studies the code and cipher systems of United States allies, neutral nations and some Communist nations.

"MPRO—provides electronic digital computing and data processing services to other divisions of N. S. A.

#### R/D

"REMP—conducts cryptanalytical research and works on applied cryptanalytic problems without restriction as to country, provides consulting services to other divisions of N. S. A., carries out research in computer componentry.

"RADE—designs radio receiving and transmitting devices, radio direction finders, radio fingerprint apparatus, studies unknown communications systems.

"STED — studies possible weakness of cipher machines in general, assists COMSEC in the design of cipher machines for United States use, studies the process of enciphering speech."

#### N. S. A. Success Explained

Successes obtained by the National Security Agency in reading the code and cipher systems of other nations are due primarily to the skillfulness of cryptanalysts, frequently aided by electronic digital computers. However, success in at least one case has also been facilitated by the fact that the United States supplied to other nations cipher machines for which it

knew the construction and wiring of the rotors.

As we have said before the success concerning one of the United States allies was aided by the fact that the United States paid money to a code clerk of that country for his information.

The National Security Agency includes a special group, the United Kingdom Liaison Office (UKLO), which is staffed by British citizens. Likewise, in the British Communication intelligence organization called GCHQ there is a corresponding N. S. A. liaison group.

Britain and the United States exchange information as to cryptanalytic methods and results in reading the code systems of other nations and their respective networks of radio intercept stations supplement one another. Besides the United Kingdom, the United States maintains close cooperation with Canada in the field of communications intelligence.

As we know from our previous experience in working at N. S. A., the United States successfully reads the secret communications of more than forty nations, including its own allies.

Besides what we have said above, other factors in our decision to defect were the suppression of information, restraints on the freedom of expression and political activity and discrimination against people who are not theists which exist in the United States.

For instance, according to United States press reports, the Federal Government each year confiscates 50,000,000 pieces of mail entering the United States, frequently without notifying the addressees that any seizure has taken place.

In the State of Maryland, where we lived, in order to hold any post whatsoever with the State Government it is necessary to take an oath to the effect that one is a theist.

People whose political convictions are unpopular with those who determine United States policy are frequently haled before investigating committees, harassed, fined, imprisoned and denied jobs.

#### Passport Procedure Scored

By means of withholding passports, the United States Department attempts to keep within United States borders citizens whose political views are not in favor. Victims of this practice have won some court battles, but the State Department is constantly pressing Congress for new legislation to tighten up the issuance of passports.

Are these practices in keeping with the free and open society which United States officials so often proclaim exists in the United States? We do not think so.

Finally, we would like to say a few words about our personal situations. We have, of course, renounced our American citizenship. We have asked the Soviet Government to grant us Soviet citizenship and assistance in learning the Russian language. Both of these requests have been met and, in addition, the Soviet Government has offered us the choice of living wherever we choose. Moreover, we have been offered the opportunity of continuing our educations and assistance in finding jobs in our capacities as mathematicians, providing approximately the same salaries as we received in the United States.

Recently we made a tour of the Soviet Union, visiting a number of cities, plants, collective farms, universities, exhibitions, cultural centers and sanatoria. We have familiarized ourselves with the way the Soviet people live, the progress they have made, and the problems they now face.

We will be glad to hear from relatives or friends who wish to correspond with us or visit us and we will give them a good reception.

# TWO CODE CLERKS DEFECT TO SOVIET; INDICT U.S. 'SPYING'



Associated Press Radiophoto

**NEW SOVIET CITIZENS:** William H. Martin, left, and Bernon F. Mitchell, former employees of the U. S. National Security Agency, who defected to the Soviet Union, at news conference yesterday in Moscow. Sign in foreground is Cyrillic spelling of Mr. Martin's name.

## WAR THREAT SEEN

**Military Policy Scored  
by Ex-N.S.A. Workers  
—Secrets Bared**

*Texts of Mitchell and Martin statements are on Page 8.*

**By OSGOOD CARUTHERS**

Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, Sept. 6.—The Soviet Union presented today two young United States defectors from the top-secret National Security Agency in Washington.

Speaking from a brightly lighted stage in the headquarters of the Soviet Journalists Union, the two defectors, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, said they had left the United States and taken up Soviet citizenship primarily because they opposed United States intelligence methods. They said they feared these methods would lead to war.

The two men especially objected to the use of intelligence reconnaissance flights by United States planes over the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

The two men were dressed in neat American suits and appeared in the best of health and spirits. They showed no qualms from the top-secret National Security Agency in Washington. States Government of "carrying out policies dangerous to world peace."

The two men described in detail the organization and functions of the National Security Agency, for which they had worked as mathematicians in the Cryptology Department for the last three years. They told their Soviet hosts that the United States transport plane C-130 shot down in September, 1958, over the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic with the loss of seventeen airmen was carrying special electronic equipment on a penetration mission to locate and test Soviet radar defenses.

Martin and Mitchell disappeared after having gone together on vacation last June 24. Their disappearance was reported Aug. 1.

At the news conference staged by the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry today, they would not reveal the exact date of their arrival in the Soviet Union or how they had journeyed here. They said only that they were now studying Russian and pre-

## TWO CODE CLERKS DEFECT TO SOVIET

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paring to enter Moscow University to continue their education and research in the mathematical field.

The method in which they were presented suggested that the Soviet Union intended to utilize extensively their statements and revelations. This is likely to be a part of the continuing propaganda campaign aimed at indicting the United States before world opinion on Moscow's charges of aggression and war preparations.

### Lone Statements Read

The two men took turns reading long statements justifying their defection on the ground that they had become "disenchanted" by United States Government policies. In addition to their objections to the use of reconnaissance flights to seek out Communist defenses, the two men said they were disenchanted also by the fact that their organization spied on the United States' allies and used money and arms in efforts to overthrow foreign regimes considered unfriendly to the United States.

Mr. Martin, a 29-year-old Washington University, formerly from Ellensburg, Wash., and Mr. Mitchell, a 31-year-old graduate of Stanford University, formerly from Eureka, Calif., indicated that there were personal and social reasons as well as political considerations for defecting. They said they believed they would "be better accepted socially" in the Soviet Union and would "be better able to carry out our professional activities."

The two men, bachelor friends since they served in the Navy in 1951, grinned at each other

as one of them made a reference to women reading from a prepared statement. The statement said they thought the Soviet Union encouraged and utilized the talents of women better than did the United States and that this "makes Soviet women more desirable as mates."

### Cameras Record Scene

Mr. Mitchell was the first to speak. Soviet television and newsreel cameras recorded the scene in the gilded theatre of the House of Journalists as the men sat under banks of hot spotlights. At times, Mr. Mitchell's voice was almost inaudible as he read from a photo copy of a statement he said he and his friend had prepared before they left the United States. He said they had deposited the original statement in a safe deposit box in a bank in Laurel, Md.

The statement began by saying the men hoped to explain to relatives, friends and others why they had sought citizenship in the Soviet Union. Since starting work for the National Security Agency in the summer of 1957, they said, they had learned that the "United States Government knowingly makes false and deceptive statements" in defending its own actions and in condemning the actions of other nations.

They said they also had learned that the United States Government gave money to a code clerk working in the Washington Embassy of an ally. The purpose, they said, was to gain information that assisted in the deciphering of that ally's coded messages.

"It was a difficult and painful experience to leave our native country, families and friends," the men said. Yet we felt that the United States Government, in carrying out policies dangerous to world peace, should not be allowed to rely upon these emotional attachments to guarantee the loyalty of citizens."